Previous research by Schneider and Jacoby (2003) has demonstrated the existence of a correlation between welfare participation and political attitudes within the American mass public. However, the underlying structure of this empirical relationship has never been tested directly. Therefore, important questions remain: Does welfare participation really shape the attitudes of program beneficiaries? Or, do the policy attitudes of welfare recipients affect their reliance on public assistance programs? In this research note, we use some unique survey data from the 1992 CPS National Election Study to examine these questions. The empirical results
associated with support for expansion of those benefits (Cook and Barrett 1992) , lower levels of political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) , favorable attitudes toward government spending (Jacoby 2000) , and a stronger sense about the efficacy of personal political action (Soss 1999 (Soss , 2000 .Thus, the existence of a correlation between welfare participation and politically-relevant beliefs and attitudes is not really a matter of dispute. However, there is no clear scholarly consensus about the underlying sources of this connection.
One commonly-cited explanation for the impact of public assistance on political attitudes is the supposed existence of a broad culture of dependence (Lewis 1961 (Lewis , 1966 Friedman 1962; Murray 1984) . Stated very briefly, this perspective holds that welfare dependence fosters undesirable psychological attributes among program recipients (Becker 1981) . Among other things, people who receive public benefits supposedly develop a paternalistic view toward government; they view the public sector as the source of redress for all manner of personal as well as societal problems (Mead 1997) . By implication, recipients should favor more activist governmental policies. Schneider and Jacoby (2003) demonstrate that there is little systematic empirical support for the culture of dependence hypothesis. Their analysis shows that the impact of welfare participation on citizens' social and political orientations is quite weak and narrowly confined to a few specific policy attitudes. They argue that this is inconsistent with the pervasive effects that should result from a true culture of dependence.
Instead, Schneider and Jacoby (2003) point to self-interest as an alternative explanation for the relationship between welfare and public opinion. People who receive governmental benefits should support the programs that provide them, while non-recipients should oppose the use of public resources for programs with no personal payoffs. The "clear, substantial costs and benefits" associated with welfare create precisely the kind of situation where such effects are most likely to emerge (Sears and Funk 1990) , even though they are relatively rare in public opinion more generally.
Schneider and Jacoby's conclusions must be qualified somewhat because their analysis is based upon a recursive structure in which the effects run from welfare participation to attitudes and not vice versa. But, this model specification does not allow for the possibility that political orientations, themselves, could affect individual participation in welfare programs. And, there are theoretical reasons to suggest that this might be the case.
For example, the latter direction of influence is implied by the view that the poor are qualitatively different from the rest of society: Their attitudes about interpersonal relationships, individual obligations, and governmental responsibilities are based upon their distinctive disadvantaged status, relative to the more affluent strata of the population (Murray 1984) .
According to this perspective, poor people believe that society owes them something-food, shelter, income, medical care, and so on (Mead 1986 ). This translates into political attitudes that are supportive of governmental programs. Consequently, people enter the welfare system because they believe that they are entitled to receive public support (Gans 1995) .
From a different perspective, the general literature on political participation shows that citizen-initiated activity is heavily conditioned by beliefs about governmental responsiveness (Verba and Nie 1971; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) . People who believe that public officials will listen to them are more likely than others to contact those officials in the first place.
This same phenomenon may extend to voluntary enrollment in public assistance programs.
Those with positive feelings about the welfare system probably anticipate better treatment from administrators; they should, therefore, be more likely to put forth the effort required to obtain governmental services.
Thus, the underlying structure of the relationship between public assistance and political attitudes remains unclear. None of the previous studies have really addressed this question. Some researchers make no attempt at systematic empirical analysis (Murray 1984; Mead 1986 Mead , 1997 .
Other analysts use a priori assumptions to justify the specification of their statistical models (Cook and Barrett 1992; Soss 1999; Schneider and Jacoby 2003) . To our knowledge, no one has tested the potential for reciprocal relationships between these two phenomena. That is precisely our objective in the remainder of this research note.
DATA AND METHODS
Our interest lies primarily in the simultaneous relationships between public assistance and political attitudes. However, welfare participation and psychological orientations toward governmental activity are also affected by a number of other factors. The latter must be taken into account in any statistical analysis. Fortunately, information sufficient for doing so is contained in the CPS 1992 American National Election Study.
The general structure of our model is shown in Figure 1 . First, consider the two endogenous variables, the main focus of our analysis. Welfare participation is a dichotomous variable, coded one for anyone receiving benefits from means-tested governmental programs and zero for all non-recipients.
1 Policy attitudes are measured via a two-item scale created from responses to questions about government guaranteed jobs and the tradeoff between government services and spending. 2 The scale is coded so that higher values correspond to greater opposition to governmental activity in these areas.
Moving on to the exogenous variables, we begin with individual demographic characteristics. These include: Income (in thousands of dollars), number of children in the home, length of time the respondent has lived at his/her current residence (in years), and dummy variables for occupational status (coded one for respondents who are unemployed), race (one for African Americans), gender (one for females), marital status (one for unmarried respondents), and home ownership (one for non-owners). We also include an extra dichotomous variable, coded one for anyone who is simultaneously single, female, and unemployed with children in the home, and coded zero otherwise.
The reason for selecting this particular set of demographic variables is to capture the major eligibility criteria for U.S. welfare programs. As such, these variables constitute unambiguously exogenous determinants of reliance on governmental benefits. Note that the model does not include a direct path from the demographic variables to policy attitudes. This specification is based upon the long line of research by Sears and his colleagues, which demonstrates clearly that self interest stemming from personal life circumstances generally has no effect on political attitudes (e.g., Sears and Funk 1990) .
The second set of variables is comprised of individual feelings about two core values:
Egalitarianism and moral traditionalism. These variables are measured using multiple-item scales in which larger scores correspond to greater support for equal opportunity and for accepted, conventional life styles, respectively. 3 Value orientations like these are widely believed to be some of the fundamental building blocks of human behavior (e.g., Rokeach 1973) , influencing virtually all aspects of everyday life (e.g., Schwartz 1996) . As such, these two variables are hypothesized to exert direct effects on both welfare participation and policy attitudes.
The third set of variables is composed of affective reactions toward several groups and institutions in American society. Specifically, we employ feeling thermometer responses toward poor people, Blacks, people on welfare, and the federal government. 4 The reasoning here is based upon the "likability heuristic" proposed by Brady and Sniderman (1985) . Feelings about the providers and recipients of welfare services function as easy cues for individuals to determine their own attitudes about those services (Schneider and Ingram 1993) . At the same time, these feelings may also affect a person's overt behavior-that is, their willingness to receive welfare benefits, themselves. For these reasons, affective reactions toward groups and institutions are specified to have an impact on both endogenous variables in the model.
Symbolic political predispositions comprise a fourth set of exogenous variables. We employ party identification, ideological self-placement, and symbolic racism. The former two variables are measured using the standard seven-point scales, with larger values corresponding to more Republican and conservative positions, respectively. Symbolic racism is operationalized as a four-item summated rating scale coded so that higher values represent stronger manifestations of "modern racism" (Sears 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996) . 5 A long line of research has demonstrated repeatedly that these symbolic predispositions are among the strongest determinants of issue attitudes among the American mass public (Sears 1993) .
The various structural linkages depicted in Figure 1 are all justified on theoretical grounds. However, the resultant model is nonrecursive because of the reciprocal paths of influence between welfare participation and attitudes. Fortunately, this does not pose any insurmountable barriers: Each of the endogenous variables is affected directly by some, but not all, of the exogenous variables. And, fortuitously, this implies that there is sufficient information to obtain unique estimates of the model's coefficients. Rivers and Vuong (1988) and advocated by Alvarez (1997) . 6 The structural equation for political attitudes is estimated using two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS), a simple generalization of standard twostage least squares methodology.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The quality of the estimates in any nonrecursive model is dependent upon the degree to which the data conform to the assumptions used for identification (i.e., the ability to obtain unique estimates of the model paramters). In this context, the instrumental variables used to identify each structural equation must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable and uncorrelated with the disturbance term for that equation. Fortunately, the data used here conform very nicely to these requirements. First, the exogenous variables are definitely Second, the assumptions about the instrumental variables do appear to be adequate for model identification purposes. The Sargan test produces a chi-square statistic that can be used to assess the validity of instruments in a structural equation (Gujarati 2003, p. 713 Moving on to the other independent variables in Table 1 , the coefficient for egalitarianism is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient for moral traditionalism is positive and significant. Given the coding of these variables, this shows that people who favor equal opportunity are also more supportive of governmental services, while those who adhere to moral traditionalism are opposed to federal activity. The negative coefficients for the various feeling thermometers indicate that people with positive reactions toward welfare recipients, African Americans, poor people, and the federal government are all more favorable toward governmental activity. Note, however, that only the coefficients for the latter two variables are statistically different from zero. Finally, the positive and statistically significant coefficients for party identification, ideology, and symbolic racism confirm that Republicans, conservatives, and people with relatively racist orientations all show greater opposition toward government-guaranteed jobs, spending, and social services. Table 2 shows the 2SCML estimates for the equation predicting welfare participation.
Note that the last coefficient in the table (labeled "First-stage residuals") is a by-product of the estimation procedure and is not amenable to substantive interpretation on its own. Apart from this feature, the results are interpreted as in other probit analysis.
Once again, the equation fits the data quite well with a pseudo R 2 value of 0.363. The most important result within the context of this study is the positive coefficient on the attitude variable. This suggests that people who are more opposed to governmental activity are also more likely to receive public assistance-an unexpected and completely nonsensical result. But, the coefficient does not achieve statistical significance. So, it is almost certainly due to sampling error and cannot be interpreted as a "real"effect.
The strongest determinants of public aid receipt in Table 2 are Interestingly, the two values have no effect. The coefficients for egalitarianism and moral traditionalism show the expected signs, but they are tiny in magnitude and they do not approach statistical significance. This result is, perhaps, somewhat surprising. But, it is fully consistent with the growing body of evidence which suggests that the impact of core values on human behavior is more limited than was hypothesized in earlier social psychological theories (e.g., Maio and Olson 1998; Jacoby 2006) .
Group evaluations have a discernible, but limited, impact on welfare participation. The coefficients for feelings about welfare recipients and the federal government are both positive and statistically significant. Apparently, feelings about program beneficiaries and about the source of welfare services help determine whether people will obtain benefits themselves. On the other hand, feelings about poor people and African Americans have no effect; the cofficients for these variables are tiny and nonsignificant.
Probit coefficients are difficult to interpret in their original form, and this problem is exacerbated by the nonrecursive nature of the model. Therefore, it is useful to convey the central results from Table 2 in terms of predicted probabilities. The major feature of this display is the nearly horizontal orientation of the predicted probability curve. The slight, positive slope near the right side of the curve shows that the predicted probability of receiving welfare participation is highest among those who exhibit the most negative attitudes toward governmental services-again, this is a result that is contrary to reasonable substantive expectations. But, the latter should not be taken very seriously since the effect is not statistically significant. In graphical terms, a perfectly flat curve would fit very easily within the confidence band shown in Figure 2 . This confirms that the likelihood of receiving public assistance just does not covary with political attitudes.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The results produced by our empirical analysis are unambiguous: Policy attitudes have no impact whatsoever on welfare participation. By testing explicitly for the latter relationship, we overcome a potentially serious weakness in Schneider and Jacoby's (2003) earlier study.
Nevertheless, the estimates from the current, nonrecursive, model confirm their basic conclusions very nicely.
It is not that the receipt of public assistance is completely devoid of individual-level affective influences. However, the relevant attitudes are highly focused and specific to the immediate actors within the welfare system. This is fully consistent with other research which shows that negative feelings about government and about program beneficiaries function as one of the primary impediments to individual welfare enrollments (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Zucchino 1997; Hays 2003; Soss 2000; DeParle 2004; Shipler 2004 ). In contrast, attitudes about more general stimuli-the poor, African Americans, and (most important, for present purposes) public policies that provide ameliorative services-have no effect on program participation.
Our results show that welfare recipients clearly recognize the connection between their personal situations and the services that government provides them. Understandably enough, people come to support the kinds of programs that provide them with direct and personal returns.
In other words, this is a manifestation of self interest. While such a finding is intuitively reasonable, it is somewhat surprising in light of prior research. A long line of studies strongly indicates that self-interest effects are largely nonexistent in American public opinion. And some of the earlier analyses that reach this conclusion examined precisely the same issues that we do-government spending and government-guaranteed jobs (Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; Sears and Lau 1983; Sears and Citrin 1985) .
But, why do we find self-interest effects when many others did not? The reason is straightforward: We have an unusually direct and accurate measure of self interest. Reliance on public aid creates an immediate and obvious stake in government activity (Soss 1999; . This is precisely the kind of situation where self-interest effects are most likely to emerge (Sears and Funk 1990) .
It is also important to emphasize what we did not find in the empirical analysis. Again, policy attitudes have no effect on welfare participation. Our results show that, once we take socioeconomic background and feelings about welfare actors into account, orientations toward governmental responsibilities are unrelated to the likelihood of receiving public assistance.
People who believe the government has an obligation to provide social services are no more or less likely to participate in welfare programs than are those who maintain the opposite view of the public sector's role.
This, in turn, provides strong evidence against the more general argument that "the poor are different" from the rest of society in terms of their outlook toward governmental activity.
There is simply nothing to suggest that disadvantaged people believe public services are due to them as a basic right of citizenship. Thus, a major premise of conservative attacks on the American welfare state seems to lack an empirical foundation.
Nevertheless, the preceding line of thinking is exactly what led to the sweeping reforms of the American welfare system that were carried out under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. It is almost impossible to overstate the extreme, vitriolic nature of the debates on this topic. For example, Sidel (1996) reports that during the 1995 Congressional debates over social program spending, certain U.S. Representatives called welfare recipients "wolves" and "alligators" who were unable to take care of themselves. The empirical results from this study offer a direct contradiction to such negative and demeaning characterizations of the people who rely on public aid. Thus, one of the broadest and most important public policy changes in recent years seems to be based, at least in part, upon a flawed premise regarding the target population.
Why, then, do so many people-scholars, political elites, and ordinary citizens alikecontinue to focus on negative stereotypes of welfare recipients? We believe that there are three reasons for such widespread misperceptions. First, there is simple political expediency. As several scholars have pointed out, conservatives find the supposedly detrimental impact of welfare on individuals to be a potent symbol (Harrington 1962; Piven and Cloward 1993; Gans 1995) . It provides a ready justification for reducing the size of government, particularly the scope of social programs, without appearing to be cruel and uncaring about individual needs.
Second, the very idea of welfare is contradictory to the predominant ideology underlying American political culture (Hartz 1955 , Rimlinger 1971 McClosky and Zaller 1984) .
Throughout society, liberals as well as conservatives are highly ambivalent about public assistance programs because they are inimical to the fundamental principles of individualism, self-motivation, and the work ethic (Feldman and Zaller 1992) . Such contradictions are more easily resolved by focusing on the characteristics of the individual recipients rather than by questioning the viability of the overall social and political system. Thus, derogatory characterizations of welfare recipients provide a palatable rationalization for some persistent societal problems (Schneider and Ingram 1993) .
The third factor contributing to the widespread belief that only "certain kinds of people" participate in welfare programs is issue framing. The mass media tend to cover poverty and related issues in episodic rather than thematic terms (Iyengar 1991; Gilens 1999) . That is, they focus on specific cases and events rather than broad, ongoing processes and structures. This has a direct impact on popular understandings of social problems. Iyengar states that "the predominant news frame for poverty has the effect of shifting responsibility from society to the poor" (1991, p. 67), while Gilens argues that "racial distortions in the media's coverage of poverty are largely responsible for public misperceptions of the poor" (1999, p. 6). With an ongoing stream of such messages, it is not at all surprising that negative stereotypes about welfare recipients persist.
Thus, we can identify a number of reasons why mistaken beliefs about the poor continue to function as one of the most prominent counterattacks against the modern American welfare state. It is important to emphasize that this ongoing phenomenon does not stem entirely from mass ignorance. Instead, there are clear political, cultural, and institutional factors that perpetuate its existence. The latter can all operate without systematic empirical support. Taken together, they generate a widespread misconception that stigmatizes the poor and needy strata within American society.
Overall, the relationship between citizens and the American welfare system is based upon realistic considerations. Our analysis confirms that people seek public assistance because of direct economic need, along with specific beliefs about the kinds of people they will encounter.
Program participation is not based upon more general psychological predispositions (Auletta 1982; Zucchino 1997) . Once they enter the system, however, welfare recipients are distinctly supportive of the programs that provide them with benefits (Cook and Barrett 1992; Schneider and Jacoby 2003) . Of course, lacking individual-level longitudinal data, we cannot establish definitively a causal connection. Nevertheless, people appear to be acting consistently in ways that maximize their personal utilities. From a strictly economic perspective, individual participation in the American welfare system seems to be a highly rational enterprise. 3. The six statements used to create the egalitarianism scale are: "Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed." "We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country." "This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are." "It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others." "If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems." "One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance." Responses to these statements are recorded on a five-point scale ranging from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly. Attitude toward government activity Predicted probability of receiving welfare benefits Figure 2 : Predicted probability of individual welfare participation across the range of attitudes toward government activity.
Note:
The solid line in the figure shows the predicted probabilities obtained from the 2SCML probit estimation of the equation with welfare participation as the dependent variable, demographic characteristics and attitude toward government activity as independent variables. The dotted lines show the 95% confidence band for the predicted probabilities.
